Health Law: Quality & Liability

Professor Pope, Fall 2017 Final Exam Scoring

Multiple Choice (60)

| 1. B | 7. C | 13. C | 19. A | 25. B |
|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| 2. B | 8. A | 14. B | 20. D | 26. D |
| 3. B | 9. A | 15. A | 21. A | 27. C |
| 4. D | 10. E | 16. A | 22. A | 28. B |
| 5. B | 11. D | 17. D | 23. D | 29. A |
| 6. A | 12. D | 18. C | 24. A | 30. A |

Essay 1 of 3 (25)

| Surgeon - Negligence | | |
|---|----|--|
| The problem stipulated that there was no negligence in the administration of the surgery. | | |
| Surgeon – Informed Consent | | |
| DUTY - This is Minnesota, so the "reasonable patient" standard applies. | | |
| DUTY - A reasonable patient would want to know about the double booking, because of increased | | |
| risks (for example, from extended duration of surgery), especially since it is avoidable. | | |
| DUTY – Defendant may argue that the DB practice is so pervasive that the "common knowledge" | | |
| exception applies. | | |
| BREACH - The surgeon did not disclose the double booking. | | |
| BREACH – The surgeon did disclose that she would be assisted. But this is not the same as disclosure | | |
| of DM. "Assisting" suggests that the surgeon would still be primary. | | |
| INJURY - The patient is injured. | | |
| CAUSATION 1 - This patient said that she would not have had the surgery (at least not the double- | | |
| booked surgery), if she had known it would be double booked. | | |
| CAUSATION 2 - It is unclear whether the reasonable patient would consent to surgery if she knew it | 2 | |
| would be double booked. She probably would NOT consent, if there were an alternative with lower | | |
| risks and the same benefits (for example, surgery with a surgeon that is not double booked). | | |
| CAUSATION 3 – She probably would still have the surgery. It is unclear whether the injury was | 2 | |
| PROBABLY caused by the double booking. The patient must establish that if she had a non-double- | | |
| booked surgery, then she PROBABLY would not have been injured. | | |
| Fellow – Battery | | |
| The patient did not consent to surgery by the fellow. So, there was no consent to having this procedure | 2 | |
| performed by this clinician. | | |
| The consent form noted that the surgeon would be "assisted." | | |
| But performing is very different from assisting. | | |
| Hospital – Vicarious Liability | | |
| The fellow was probably an employee. Therefore, the hospital is vicarious liable for her torts. | 2 | |
| It is less likely that the hospital is vicariously liable for the surgeon' torts unless she is an employee. | 2 | |
| The surgeon may also be vicariously liable for negligence of the fellow she supervised. | | |
| Hospital - Direct Liability - Negligent Policies | | |
| DUTY – The plaintiff needs (and can surely get) expert testimony to establish that the reasonable | 1 | |
| hospital would not allow double booked surgeries. | | |
| BREACH – While this hospital allowed double-booking, that appears to at least be a "school of | | |
| thought." So, there was no breach, unless the hospital breached standards or conditions of the SOT. | | |
| INJURY – The patient is injured, | | |
| CAUSATION – As with the informed consent case against the surgeon, it is unclear whether the injury | | |
| was PROBABLY caused by the double booking. | | |
| Abandonment | | |
| The surgeon was still engaged, just arguably not as much as appropriate. | | |
| TOTAL | 25 | |

Essay 2 of 3 (25)

| Adams – Treatment Relationship | | |
|--|----|--|
| Patient has a malpractice claim against Adams only if she were in a "treatment relationship" with Adams. | | |
| Patient and Adams were in a treatment relationship, because this was a "formal" consult. While patient | | |
| was directly treated by Washington, Adams (a) was on call, (b) billed, (c) got detailed clinical data on | | |
| patient, and (d) provided detailed advice. | | |
| Adams - Malpractice | | |
| DUTY - The consulted experts are qualified to opine on the SOC, because this jurisdiction follows a | | |
| national standard of care. | | |
| BREACH - The consulted experts opine that Adams did not follow the SOC. | | |
| INJURY – The patient is injured. | | |
| CAUSATION – The testimony of the second expert is adequate. It is fine that there is an alternative | | |
| cause, so long as malpractice is the most likely cause. The testimony of the first expert is too weak. | | |
| Hospital – Vicarious Liability | | |
| The hospital may be vicariously liable for Adams, if he is an employee. (Alternatively one might argue | 1 | |
| non-delegable duty doctrine) | | |
| Even if Adams is not an employee, the hospital may be vicariously liable on a theory of ostensible | 1 | |
| agency, especially since Adams was not chosen by the patient. But he was not SEEN by the patient. | | |
| Hospital - Negligent Credentialing | | |
| DUTY – While the hospital may have breached its own standards, the tort duty is defined by what the | 4 | |
| reasonable hospital would have done. Contrast the screening duty under EMTALA. | | |
| BREACH – The hospital did not breach the SOC. Its own standards are apparently higher than the | | |
| standard of care. | | |
| EMTALA | | |
| Outside the scope, since the problem asked only about claims against Adams. | | |
| TOTAL | 25 | |

Essay 3 of 3 (25)

| CIGNA – ERISA Preemption | | |
|--|----|--|
| Patient might have had a claim against CIGNA for negligent utilization review. But the claim is | 3 | |
| preempted by ERISA. The patient's health insurance is a private employee benefit. | | |
| Patient's only remedy is under ERISA Section 502. She can only recover the value of the denied PET. | 2 | |
| It is unclear whether patient was contractually entitled to coverage of the PET. | 1 | |
| Physician – Malpractice | | |
| DUTY - There may be an applicable SOC that requires physicians to lie to insurance companies. | 2 | |
| BREACH - Defendant did not lie. That looks like breach. But see Locke – DEF own personal | 2 | |
| standard may not be the SOC. | | |
| BREACH - But it seems implausible to require the physician to commit fraud. | 1 | |
| BREACH - Moreover, there is probably a SOT that physicians should be honest advocates. Since the | | |
| defendant at least complied with this alternative SOT, there is no breach. | | |
| INJURY - The patient is injured. | | |
| CAUSATION – Even if there were breach, it probably would not have averted the injury. | | |
| CAUSATION - But since it would have reduced chance of injury by 30%, patient could recover lost | | |
| chance damages. | | |
| Physician – Informed Consent | | |
| DUTY – The reasonable patient would want to know the importance of the PET, given her diagnostic | 2 | |
| history and the high stakes. See Jandre (failure to inform of diagnostically superior test even though not | | |
| malpractice to use inferior test). | | |
| BREACH – It is unclear if the physician told the patient about her need for a PET. | | |
| INJURY – The patient is injured. | | |
| CAUSATION – The patient must establish that had the physician disclosed, she and a reasonable | | |
| patient would have paid out of pocket. Then, the lesion would have been detected earlier. Still, the | | |
| evidence suggests this probably would not have changed the result. | | |
| MCC - Vicarious Liability | | |
| Physician is an employee of MCC. Therefore, MCC is vicariously liable for her negligence (if any). | | |
| TOTAL | 25 | |